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Numeracy as a precursor to pro-social behavior: The impact of
numeracy and presentation format on the cognitive mechanisms
underlying donation decisions
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Abstract
Donation requests often convey numerical information about the people in need. In two studies we investigated
the effects of numeracy and presentation format on the underlying affective and cognitive mechanisms of donation
decisions. In Study 1, participants were presented with information about a victim in need, either in a frequency format
or in a percentage format. In Study 2, we manipulated the identifiability and number of target victims. Our results
demonstrate that donations of individuals lower in numeracy were more susceptible to changes in numeric presentation
format than those higher in numeracy. Importantly, the underlying mechanisms for donations differed by numeracy.
Whereas the mental image of the victim influenced donation decisions of less numerate people only, the estimated
impact of a donation was positively correlated with donation amounts for both more and less numerate individuals.
Keywords: donation decisions, numeracy, mental images, affect.
1 Introduction
In reports of the effects of natural and man-made catas-
trophes (e.g., famines, floods, tsunamis, and wars), it is
common to encounter statistics about the number of hu-
man lives affected. For example, the earthquake in Haiti
on January 12th, 2010 affected 3 million people, of which
approximately 230,000 lost their lives (BBC, 2010) and
an estimated 200,000 families were left homeless (Save
the Children, 2010). Although it may be difficult to
truly comprehend the scope of such tragedies (Slovic,
2007), numerical figures are typically used to convey the
enormity of suffering. Humanitarian aid organizations
likewise use numerical information to communicate the
needs of the victims and to entice benefactors to make fi-
nancial contributions. The total number of lives affected,
the estimated number of individuals that would benefit
from a donation, and the ratio between them can all be
important aspects in the decision to help. Potential donors
are expected to understand and use such numerical infor-
mation when deciding whether to support a humanitarian
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aid project. However, comprehension and use of this in-
formation may differ depending on how it is presented
and who the potential donor is.
1.1 Effects of presentation format on dona-
tion decisions
The importance of how information about lives at risk is
communicated has been highlighted by recent research
on people’s willingness to contribute financially to hu-
manitarian causes. For example, an identified victim gen-
erally has greater chances of being helped than a sta-
tistical victim (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Schelling,
1968; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Small, Loewenstein,
& Slovic, 2007). Moreover, the identification of people
in need of help has stronger effects on charitable giving
if the identified victim is a single individual victim com-
pared to a group of victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005b). Pre-
sentation of a single victim vs. a group of victims may
alter donation behavior partly because individual targets
are processed differently than group targets (Hamilton &
Sherman, 1996; Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, &
Sherman, 1999). Dickert and Slovic (2009), for example,
have demonstrated that presenting an individual as part
of a larger group (rather than as a single victim) reduces
affective reactions to that person.
Affective reactions, in turn, play an important role in
the decision to help others (e.g., Batson, 1990; Kogut &
Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Loewenstein & Small, 2007;
Slovic, 2007; Huber, Van Boven, McGraw, & Johnson-
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Graham, 2011). These emotional responses as well as the
general motivation to help seem to be influenced by the
way information is processed. For example, presenting
participants with a donation task after priming delibera-
tion resulted in lower empathy and lower donations com-
pared to priming affective reactions (Dickert, Sagara, &
Slovic, 2011; Small et al., 2007). In addition to process-
ing mode, empathic responses also seem to be related to
the vividness, proximity and similarity of the donor to the
victim (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). Information is gen-
erally more vivid when it is emotionally interesting, con-
crete, and psychologically close to the observer (Nisbett
& Ross, 1980). A theoretical approach focusing on the
vividness and concreteness of the mental images under-
lying affective reactions could explain research findings
on effects of different presentation formats, such as the
identifiability and singularity effects: Both the identifica-
tion as well as presentation of a single victim (vs. vic-
tim group) result in more coherent mental images, which
then lead to stronger affective reactions and higher do-
nations (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Loewenstein & Small,
2007; Västfjäll, Peters, & Slovic, 2008).
Presentation modes that enhance the generation of
mental images could, therefore, be conducive to elicit-
ing donations. For example, describing the number of af-
fected victims in a frequency format (e.g., 10 out of 100)
might foster more concrete mental images than a proba-
bility format (e.g., 10% out of 100; Slovic, Finucane, Pe-
ters, & MacGregor, 2002). Additionally, people exhibit
insensitivity to changes in victim number when the num-
ber grows large (i.e., psychophysical numbing; Fether-
stonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Frederick
& Fischhoff, 1998; Friedrich et al., 1999; Slovic, 2007;
see also Baron, 1997). This could be a result of less clear
mental images as it is very difficult (if not impossible) to
mentally process large groups of people to the same de-
gree of detail as one is able to do with just a single indi-
vidual. In addition to differences in presentation modes,
however, when information about victims is presented in
numerical form, differences in numeric ability (i.e., nu-
meracy) between individual donors could result in differ-
ent mental images underlying emotions and donations.
1.2 Influence of numeracy on information
processing
The ability to understand and use numeric concepts to
perform rudimentary mathematical operations, compare
magnitudes, and comprehend ratio concepts (including
fractions, proportions, percentages, and probabilities) is
conceptualized as numeric ability or “numeracy” (Pe-
ters et al., 2006; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Reyna, Nel-
son, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). Recent research has
primarily investigated the effects of numeracy on infor-
mation processing in health-related decisions, risk per-
ception and risk communication (e.g., Fagerlin, Ubel,
Smith, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2007; Keller, 2011; Lipkus
& Peters, 2009; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Pe-
ters, Dieckmann, Dixon, Hibbard, & Mertz, 2007; Pe-
ters, et al., 2009; Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann,
2007). In these studies, higher numeracy is related to bet-
ter comprehension and integration of numerical informa-
tion, usually leading to more informed and therefore bet-
ter decisions. Additionally, differential access to numeric
information might give rise to altered judgments regard-
ing how effective a treatment or risk-reducing measure
would be.
Highly numerate individuals also tend to be less in-
fluenced by the way numerical information is presented
whereas less numerate generally benefit from an eas-
ily accessible, ordered and more concrete representation
of the information (e.g., Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, &
Gigerenzer, 2009; Peters, Dieckmann, et al., 2007). How-
ever, some research points to the possibility that this is
not always the case. In more difficult numeric tasks, risk
perception (Keller & Siegrist, 2009) and probabilistic rea-
soning (Chapman & Liu, 2009) vary by presentation for-
mat even for highly numerate individuals. Chapman and
Liu (2009) found that presenting highly numerate partic-
ipants with a Bayesian reasoning task in a frequency for-
mat resulted in better performance relative to a probabil-
ity format. Less numerate participants’ performance im-
proved in the frequency format as well, but to a lesser de-
gree. Thus, whether presentation formats influence per-
formance of more or less numerate individuals seems to
be task dependent.
The use of presentation formats that incorporate non-
numerical information could further influence informa-
tion processing differently for more and less numerate
individuals. Dieckmann, Slovic and Peters (2009), for
example, examined risk perceptions of terrorist forecasts
and found that information was differentially processed
depending on numeracy. Whereas highly numerate indi-
viduals focused more on the stated likelihood of a terror-
ist attack, those lower in numeracy were more influenced
by narrative evidence and presumably by a more coher-
ent causal mental representation that they formed from
the narrative. This evidence suggests a different use of
mental images underlying choices that is dependent on
people’s numeracy.
It may also be that the effects of presentation modes
that enhance the generation of mental images from num-
bers (e.g., victim numbers, average contributions, etc.)
depend on numeracy. The study by Dieckmann and col-
leagues (2009) suggests that less numerate individuals
may build a more coherent mental image of the situ-
ation from narrative information, thus promoting more
concrete information processing and likely resulting in
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stronger affective reactions (Slovic et al., 2002, 2004).
Because presentation formats also differ in their elici-
tation of mental images (e.g., frequencies vs. percent-
ages), the effect of presentation formats on donations
may be moderated by numeracy. In fact, risk percep-
tions appear to differ by number format and numeracy.
Individuals lower in numeracy perceived greater danger
from a mental patient when his potential dangerousness
was described in a frequency versus a probability format
whereas format made little difference to those higher in
numeracy (Peters et al., 2006; see also Peters, Hart, &
Fraenkel, 2011, for a medical example). Given these
results, one would expect that the effects of presenta-
tion format (e.g., frequency vs. percentage) on donations
would be stronger for less numerate individuals. Differ-
ences in risk perception and judgments could, however,
not only be the result of highly numerate individuals hav-
ing a clearer grasp and wider array of numerical infor-
mation available. Instead, we propose that more and less
numerate individuals recruit different processes based on
mental imagery to arrive at their decisions.
In the current paper, two studies investigated the ef-
fects of presentation formats (of the numeric information
about victims) and numeracy on the mechanisms under-
lying donation decisions (e.g., mental images). In Study
1, we examine the effects of frequency vs. probability
format; in Study 2, we manipulate the identifiability and
number of victims.
2 Study 1—Frequency vs. probabil-
ity
Study 1 was designed to examine whether numeracy in-
fluences the mechanisms underlying donation decisions
when presentation formats are varied. The donation task
used in the current study employed either a relative fre-
quency or a probabilistic presentation format of the num-
ber of donation recipients while simultaneously present-
ing the information about the total number of victims in
need (i.e., the reference group: 1 out of 100 or 1% out
of 100). Note that only the presentation format changes
while the numeric information was identical. Research
has shown that numeracy changes the perception of ra-
tios of numerators (1) and denominators (100) with less
numerate individuals confusing part-whole relations and
giving greater weight to the numerator and underweight-
ing the denominator (Peters, Slovic, Västfjäll, & Mertz,
2008; Peters et al., 2006; Reyna et al., 2009). In dona-
tion decisions, one might take the size of the reference
group into account in order to gauge the extent of the suf-
fering as well as the relative effectiveness of a donation.
Thus, considering the size of the reference group has been
found to influence the evaluation of humanitarian aid pro-
grams and the perception of help needed (Baron, 1997;
Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Slovic, 2007). We derived
the following hypotheses concerning presentation format
and its possible differential effects based on numeracy on
donation decisions and their underlying mechanisms:
(H1) Presenting the victim in a relative frequency for-
mat should lead to higher donations than a probability
format particularly for less numerate individuals who are
more susceptible to changes in presentation formats.
(H2) Furthermore, we expect that lower numeracy
should lead to more concrete imagery (Dieckmann et al.,
2009; Peters et al., 2006) of the victim.
(H3) Finally, affective reactions to the victims are hy-
pothesized to be related to the mental image of the victim
(Slovic, 2007). More concrete images should increase af-
fective reactions and therefore lead to higher donations.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants and design
A total of 174 participants (47% female; Mage= 23.0;
SDage = 5.4) took part in this study, which lasted approxi-
mately 15 minutes and was included in a one hour experi-
mental battery with unrelated study materials. They were
paid 12 Euros (approximately $15.66) as compensation
for their time.
We manipulated the format of the presentation of the
victim in a frequency or a probability format. We further
assessed participants’ ability to transform frequency in-
formation into probabilistic information (and vice versa)
with a numeracy measure. The primary dependent vari-
able was participants’ willingness to donate money to the
victim. Additionally, we measured participants’ affective
reactions and mental images of the victim.
2.1.2 Materials and procedure
At the beginning of the study, participants were asked to
imagine that they could contribute to a humanitarian aid
organization with the aim of reducing hunger in Africa
among poor children in danger of starvation. Their dona-
tion would always go to one child out of a group of 100
children; however, in the frequency condition the target
child was presented as “one out of 100”, whereas in the
probability condition it was presented as “one percent out
of 100”. All other information about the victim was iden-
tical in both conditions. After reading the description of
the victims’ situation, participants indicated their willing-
ness to donate (assessed as an open-ended question). On
a separate page, affective reactions (adapted from Dick-
ert, 2008; Dickert et al., 2011; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a,
2005b) were rated on a scale from 1 (don’t agree at all)
to 7 (completely agree). Specifically, these emotions in-
cluded participants’ sympathy, compassion, worry, sad-
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Figure 1: Log-transformed donation amounts by numer-
acy and presentation format.
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ness in regard to the victim, how much better participants
would feel if they donated, anticipated regret if they did
not donate, whether the victim deserves help in the view
of the participant, and the perceived moral obligation to
help.
Additionally, participants’ mental image of the victim
was assessed on the same scale as above with two state-
ments: “When I put myself in the position of this one
child (1% of the children), I can imagine its environ-
ment” and “When I picture this one child (1% of the
children), I can construct a clear and coherent impres-
sion”. Finally, numeracy was measured with a 15-item
questionnaire used by Peters, Dieckmann and colleagues
(2007). This questionnaire consists of items that require
participants to compare and translate frequency informa-
tion into probabilities (and vice versa), and includes such
questions as “if the chances of winning a lottery prize are
1%, how many of 1000 people would you expect to win
a prize?” and “if the chance of getting a viral infection is
0.0005, how many out of 10,000 people are expected to
get infected?”.
2.2 Results and discussion
2.2.1 Preliminary data analysis
Participants’ numeracy scores ranged between 6 (40%
correct) and 15 (100% correct) and a median split was
used to classify people into lower (from 6 to 12; n = 101)
and higher (from 13 to 15; n = 73) numeracy (Peters et al.,
2006; see also MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker,
2002 for conditions justifying median splits) due to sig-
nificant skew of the distribution, z(skew) = −4.71, p <
.01. Donation amounts were winsorized on the high end
(less than 7% of the data) and log-transformed to reduce
skewness.1 The affective reactions were combined into
one affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .85), and participants’
mental image ratings were aggregated into a mental im-
age scale (Cronbach’s α = .69). All independent variables
were mean-centered prior to analysis.
2.2.2 Effect of numeracy and presentation format on
donations.
Hypothesis 1 was tested with an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with presentation format (frequency vs. per-
centage) and numeracy (lower vs. higher) as independent
variables and donation amounts as the dependent vari-
able. As expected, donations were a little higher in the
frequency presentation format (M = 2.82, SD = 1.53) than
in the probability presentation format (M = 2.34, SD =
1.67), F(1, 170) = 2.94, p = .088, ηp² = .02. Additionally,
highly numerate individuals indicated that they would do-
nate less (M = 2.19, SD = 1.57) than those lower in nu-
meracy (M = 2.86, SD = 1.60), F(1, 170) = 7.91, p <
.01, ηp² = .04.2 The hypothesized interaction testing for
differential effects of presentation format depending on
numeracy was also significant, F(1, 170) = 4.30, p = .04,
ηp² = .03. Further analyses revealed that presentation for-
mat influenced donations only for those lower in numer-
acy (see Figure 1). As predicted, less numerate individu-
als were willing to donate more money in the frequency
format (M = 3.32, SD = 1.31) than in the probability for-
mat (M = 2.41, SD = 1.73), t(99) = 2.86, p < .01, d =
0.59. In contrast, among those higher in numeracy, dona-
tion amounts did not depend on presentation format (M =
2.15, SD = 1.56 and M = 2.24, SD = 1.60 for frequency
and probability presentation formats, respectively), t(71)
= 0.23, p = .82, d = 0.06.3
2.2.3 Effect of numeracy and presentation format on
mental images
We conducted a similar ANOVA to test whether partic-
ipants’ mental images of the victim were dependent on
presentation format and numerical ability (H2). Highly
1Before transformation: z(skew) = 33.74, p < .01; after transforma-
tion: z(skew) = −2.65, p < .02).
2The proportion of participants who were willing to donate anything
at all did not depend on the condition (frequency = 84% vs. percent
= 74%), χ2 (1, N = 174) = 3.16, p = .075, nor numeric ability (high
numeracy = 74% vs. low numeracy = 83%), χ2 (1, N = 174) = 2.18, p
= .14.
3A regression analysis (F(3,170) = 4.28, p < .01, R2 = .07) with nu-
meracy as a continuous predictor supported the main effects (β = .16, p
= .03; and β = −.21, p < .01, for condition and numeracy, respectively).
The interaction was no longer significant (β = −.08, p = .27), however
the relationship of numeracy and donations was significantly negative
in the frequency format (β = -.30, p < .01), whereas this is not the case
for the probability format (β = -.13, p = .24).
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numerate individuals reported less clear and less coher-
ent mental images of the victim (M = 3.18, SD = 1.41)
compared to those lower in numeracy (M = 4.07, SD =
1.61), F(1, 170) = 14.77, p < .01, ηp² = .08, support-
ing the notion that higher numeracy corresponds to more
abstract information processing. Participants reported
clearer mental images in the frequency format (M = 3.82,
SD = 1.70) than in the probability format (M = 3.57, SD
= 1.47); however, this finding did not reach significance,
F(1, 170) = 1.44, p = .23. The interaction with numeracy
was also not significant, F < 1, p > .88. Accordingly, in
the present study mental images seem to depend more on
numeracy than on the numeric presentation format.4
2.2.4 Mental images underlying affective reactions
and donations
To examine whether the relation between mental images,
affective reactions and donation amounts is different for
more and less numerate individuals, we conducted sep-
arate mediation analyses for both groups. In this anal-
ysis, we aggregated across presentation format because
presentation format did not significantly influence men-
tal images and our primary interest was to investigate
whether the role of mental images in the construction of
donation amounts differs by numerical ability (see Fig-
ure 2). We used Baron and Kenny’s (1986) regression
approach, while taking the recent critique and modifica-
tions suggested by Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) and
Preacher and Hayes (2008) into account. According to
Baron and Kenny (1986), the prerequisite for mediation
analyses is a significant relationship between a predictor
variable (i.e., mental images) and a criterion (i.e., dona-
tions). However, recent approaches to mediation point
out that this relationship is the “total effect” of the sum
of direct and indirect effects including the mediator (i.e.,
affective reactions) and that mediation should be solely
established by the presence of an indirect effect (Preacher
& Hayes, 2008; Zhao et al., 2010).
Using the bootstrapping technique advocated by
Preacher and Hayes (2008), our results demonstrated that
affective reactions significantly mediated the effect of
mental image on donation amounts (i.e., indirect effect:
95% CI [.03, .24]) for less numerate individuals.5 After
4A regression analysis with numeracy as a continuous variable
(F(3,170) = 4.69, p < .01, R2 = .08) confirmed that only numeracy
significantly predicted mental images (β = −.27, p < .001) and that
condition and the interaction did not (β = .10, p = .20; and β = −.04, p
= .59, respectively).
5Confidence intervals are constructed for β-values, which are con-
sidered significant when zero is not included in the interval. The more
conservative Sobel test (Sobel, 1982, 1987) for indirect effects showed
that the effect of mental images on donation amount through its indi-
rect effect via affective reactions was significant for both less and more
numerate individuals (Sobel test statistic = 2.22, p = .03 and Sobel test
statistic = 2.41, p = .02, respectively).
Figure 2: Mediation analyses for Study 1
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controlling for the indirect effect, no additional direct ef-
fect of mental images on donation amount remained (β
= .05, p >.54). According to these results, for individu-
als with lower numeracy, clearer mental images were as-
sociated with stronger affective reactions, which in turn
were related to higher donation amounts (i.e., indirect-
only mediation; Zhao et al., 2010). For highly numer-
ate individuals, the pattern of results is seemingly similar,
as this mediating effect of affective reactions is also sig-
nificant (95% CI [.06, .42]). However, when controlling
for the mediating effect of affective reactions, the direct
effect of mental images on donations was in the oppo-
site direction of the indirect effect, (β = −.15, p = .12).
While the indirect effect suggests that clearer mental im-
ages evoked stronger affective reactions (which in turn
were associated with higher donations), the direct effect
of mental images tended to decrease donations for highly
numerate individuals (albeit not significantly). Most im-
portantly, the difference in direct effects for more vs. less
numerate individuals was significant, z = 2.02, p < .05,
suggesting that the role of mental images in donation de-
cisions depends on numeracy.
Taken together, the results of Study 1 support the no-
tion that donation amounts among less numerate individ-
uals were influenced by the presentation format whereas
individuals with higher numeracy were not influenced by
presentation format. Note, however, that we found this
result only when dichotomizing numeracy. Possibly the
effect of presentation formation was not linearly mod-
erated by numeracy. However, the main effects of nu-
meracy were independent of whether numeracy was di-
chotomized or continuous. Specifically, less numerate
individuals indicated that they would donate more, and
they reported a more concrete mental image of the vic-
tim. The effect of mental images on donation amounts
was straightforward for those lower in numeracy; clearer
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mental images were related to stronger affective reac-
tions, which in turn were associated with higher dona-
tions. The indirect mediation was also present for indi-
viduals higher in numeracy; however the direct effect of
mental images decreased their donation amounts relative
to less numerate individuals. It should be noted that the
concreteness of the mental images was dependent only
on numeracy and not on the presentation formats that we
used. Although frequency formats are likely more im-
agery provoking than probability formats (e.g., Slovic et
al., 2002), it is possible that our presentation format ma-
nipulation was not strong enough to significantly influ-
ence mental images. Nonetheless, it is of interest that
mental images were related to individual differences in
numeracy, suggesting a propensity of low numerate indi-
viduals to engage in more concrete information process-
ing (Dieckmann et al., 2009).
However, neither the findings of mental imagery nor
the mediation analysis can fully account for the observed
interaction between numeracy and presentation format on
participants’ intention to donate. Given that philanthropic
acts are often dependent on a multitude of mechanisms
working at the same time (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007),
mental imagery is likely not the only predictor of dona-
tions that differs by numeracy. Higher numeracy typi-
cally leads to a more complete consideration and integra-
tion of numeric information (Peters, Dieckmann, et al.,
2007; Peters & Levin, 2008), which might highlight the
total quantity of lives saved in our task as quite low and
suggest that the help provided is not effective. As a re-
sult, the highly numerate may decrease their willingness
to help (e.g., a “drop in the bucket” effect; Fetherston-
haugh et al., 1997). Study 2 will address this issue and
examine the relationship between clearer mental images
and effectiveness judgments and expand the present find-
ings by using a donation task with a slightly less subtle
manipulation of presentation mode.
3 Study 2—Identifiability and mag-
nitude
Study 2 further examined the different processes under-
lying donation decisions in relation to numeracy and pre-
sentation formats. We designed Study 2 to take prior re-
search on the effects of identifiability and victim number
into account (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). Presenta-
tion formats that increase affective responses (e.g., identi-
fying the victims) are likely to increase donations as well,
and particularly so for single victims vs. groups of vic-
tims. The identification of victims produces an affect-rich
mental representation that may highlight one’s affective
response as a decision cue for helping while attenuating
the importance of numerical information about the size of
the victim group (Gong & Baron, 2010; Hsee & Rotten-
streich, 2004). Prior research has also demonstrated that
numerical information is less important (and used less ex-
tensively) by lower numerate individuals and that they are
more susceptible to changes in the presented format (e.g.,
Dieckmann et al., 2009). These results, together with our
results from Study 1 on different mental images for high
vs. low numeracy, suggest that an affect-rich presentation
format (e.g., identification of victims) increases the will-
ingness to donate for single vs. groups of victims particu-
larly for individuals with lower numeracy. We tested this
prediction in Study 2.
Moreover, we sought to replicate our findings from
Study 1 regarding the different mechanisms underlying
donation decisions for more and less numerate individu-
als. In addition to mental images, we also assessed how
effective a donation was judged. Results from Study 1
suggest that individuals higher in numeracy incorporate
more (numeric) information and possibly believe that a
donation saving only a small amount of lives is inef-
fective. If this is the case, we would expect donation
amounts to be positively related to effectiveness judg-
ments for highly numerate individuals.
(H4) Consistent with prior research on donations (e.g.,
Small & Loewenstein, 2003), we expected that identify-
ing the victims would lead to higher donations. Addi-
tionally, in line with Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 2005b), we
predicted that donations would be higher for one vs. five
victims only when the victims were identified. We ex-
pected that this pattern of results would be particularly
visible for participants lower in numeracy.
(H5) We further expected to replicate results from
Study 1 with regard to lower numeracy leading to clearer
and more concrete mental images of the victim(s). Ad-
ditionally, we hypothesized that the relationship between
mental image and donations would be mediated by affect
for less numerate individuals and not for the highly nu-
merate.
(H6) Whereas donations from individuals lower in nu-
meracy should be positively related to their mental im-
ages, donation amounts from individuals higher in nu-
meracy should be positively related to how effective a
donation is judged to be.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants and design
Participants (N = 168; Mage = 23.9, SDage = 5.1; 62% fe-
male) took part in this study, which was embedded in an
experimental battery with unrelated study materials last-
ing approximately one hour. As in Study 1, on average,
participants were compensated with 12 Euros for their ef-
fort.
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In a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, we manipulated
the presentation format (identified vs. unidentified) and
the number of children who could be helped using a fre-
quency format (1 vs. 5). The variables of interest included
willingness to donate, affective reactions, the mental rep-
resentation of the victim, and the expected impact of the
donation.
3.1.2 Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were similar to Study 1. We
presented participants with a donation task in which they
were asked to imagine that they could donate to a hu-
manitarian organization that aids children in danger of
starvation (see Appendix for an example). Depending
on the condition, participants could donate to either one
or five children and were informed that they were part
of a group of 100 similar children in need of help. In
the identified condition, the one child or the five children
were identified by pictures, whereas in the unidentified
condition they were represented by a number (1 vs. 5).
Apart from the manipulations, all other information and
measurements were identical in the four conditions. As
in Study 1, participants indicated their donation amount
with an open ended question, then on a separate page
with scales for their affective reactions (i.e., sympathy,
compassion, worry, sadness, anticipated regret, victims’
deservingness, obligation to help, and how much bet-
ter participants felt due to a donation) and mental image
(i.e., coherence and cohesiveness of their impression of
the victim). Additionally, we measured the estimated im-
pact of the donation on a 7-point scale with the statement:
“My donation would help to improve the life of this child
(these five children).” At the end of the experimental bat-
tery, numeracy was assessed using the same scale as in
Study 1.
3.2 Results and discussion
3.2.1 Preliminary data analyses
Prior to further analyses, we winsorized unusually high
donation amounts (less than 7% of the distribution) and
then log-transformed the winsorized donation amounts
to reduce skewness (before transformation: z(skew) =
43.86, p < .001; after transformation: z(skew) = −1.20, p
= .23). In the one identified victim condition, five differ-
ent pictures of children were used. A one-way ANOVA
revealed no significant differences in donation amounts
across each of the five individual victims, F(4, 36) =
1.96, p = .12; as a result, they were combined into one
identified victim condition. As in Study 1, due to signif-
icant skewness, z(skew) = −3.94, p < .001 in the numer-
acy variable, we used a median split to classify people as
higher vs. lower in numeracy. Individual affective reac-
tions were aggregated into a general affect scale (Cron-
bach’s α = .85). All independent variables were mean-
centered prior to analysis.
3.2.2 Effects of victim identification, number of vic-
tims and numeracy on donations.
To test whether identifying the victims led to higher do-
nations (H4), we conducted an ANOVA with victim iden-
tification (identified vs. unidentified), number of victims
(one vs. five) and numeracy (higher vs. lower) as fac-
tors and donation amount as the dependent variable. As
hypothesized, participants were willing to donate more
money when victims were identified (M = 2.98, SD =
1.62) than when they were not (M = 2.44, SD = 1.82),
F(1, 160) = 4.27, p = .04, ηp² = .03. The main effects
for number of victims and numeracy were not significant,
Fs < 1, ps > .33.6 However, the predicted interaction be-
tween victim identification and victim number was sup-
ported by the data, F(1, 160) = 3.31, p = .07, ηp² = .02,
replicating findings by Kogut and Ritov (2005a). Specif-
ically, when victims were identified, participants donated
more to one (M = 3.22, SD = 1.69) than to five victims
(M = 2.72, SD = 1.52), whereas the opposite pattern was
observed for unidentified victims (M = 2.15, SD = 1.84,
and M = 2.74, SD = 1.78, for one and five victims, re-
spectively). Although the three-way interaction was not
significant, F < 1, p = .67, further analyses showed that
the two-way interaction between identifiability and num-
ber of victims was significant only for participants with
lower numeracy scores, F(1, 108) = 3.88, p = .05, ηp² =
.04 (for participants with higher numeracy scores, F < 1,
p > .40). None of the other interactions was significant,
Fs < 1.1, ps > .30.7
3.2.3 Mental images underlying affective reactions
and donations.
We first asked whether the hypothesized effect of numer-
acy on mental image (H5) could be replicated in Study 2.
We conducted an ANOVA with identifiability, number of
victims, and numeracy as independent variables predict-
ing participants’ mental image. Consistent with Study
6The proportion of participants who were willing to donate anything
at all was significantly higher in the identified victim condition (87%)
than in the unidentified victim condition (74%), χ2 (1, N = 168) = 3.94,
p = .047. However, the proportion did not depend on whether there were
one (78%) or five victims (83%), χ2 (1, N = 168) = 0.81, p = .37, and
also not on participants’ numeracy score (80% for both high and low
numerate individuals), χ2 (1, N = 168) < 0.01, p > .99.
7A regression analysis (F(7,160) = 1.69, p = .11, R2 = .07) with nu-
meracy as a continuous predictor and all other variables revealed simi-
lar effects, such that only the main effect for identifiability (β = .15, p =
.048) and the interaction between identifiability and scope (β = −.16, p
= .04) significantly predicted donations. None of the other effects was
significant, βs < .09 ps > .23
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Figure 3: Mediation analyses for Study 2
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Lower Numeracy
** p < .01, * p < .05
a Regression coefficients without the mediator (affective
reaction) as predictor
b Regression coefficients with mental image and affective
reaction as predictors
1, less numerate individuals rated their mental image as
stronger (M = 3.53, SD = 1.78) than those higher in nu-
meracy (M = 2.96, SD = 1.53), F(1,160) = 3.55, p = .06,
ηp² = .02. Additionally, mental images were clearer when
victims were identified (M = 3.71, SD = 1.70) than when
they were not (M = 2.99, SD = 1.66), F(1,160) = 5.59,
p < .02, ηp² = .03. No other effects were significant, Fs
< 1, ps > .68.8 These results further support the notion
that the mental image of the victims differs by numer-
acy. The fact that we found this result with substantially
different presentation modes across the two studies sup-
ports our contention that less numerate individuals tend to
construct clearer and more concrete mental images of the
lives at risk, irrespective of how these lives are presented.
In Study 2, the effect of victim identification on clearer
mental images was additive to the effect of numeracy, as
none of the interactions were significant.
The impact of mental image on donations (and the me-
diating effect of affective reactions) was analyzed in sep-
arate mediation analyses for participants with higher and
lower numeracy (see Figure 3). We used the same tech-
nique to test for indirect and direct mediation effects as
in Study 1 (see Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes,
2008; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). A significant rela-
tionship between mental images and donation amounts
emerged for less numerate individuals (β = .33, p < .01)
whereas donation amounts for highly numerate individ-
uals were not associated with mental images (β = −.08,
p = .58). Based on Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) media-
tion technique, for less numerate individuals, we found a
positive indirect effect of the affective reactions, 95% CI
8Results of regression analysis (F(7,160) = 1.67, p = .12, R2 = .07)
with numeracy as a continuous predictor confirmed the ANOVA results.
The main effect of numeracy (β = −.14, p = .07) and identifiability (β
= .20, p < .01) predicted mental images. None of the other effects was
significant, βs < .04, ps > .64
Table 1: Correlation matrix for less and more numerate
individuals.
Donation
amount
Affect Mentalimage Impact
Less numerate
Donation
amount
1
Affect .51** 1
Mental
image .29** .32** 1
Impact .40** .30** .22* 1
More numerate
Donation
amount
1
Affect .48** 1
Mental
image −.03 −.08 1
Impact .59** .39** −.35** 1
** p < .01, * p < .05.
[.05, .26] but no direct effect (β = .14, p =.10) once the
indirect effect has been taken into account, replicating re-
sults from Study 1.9 Therefore, for less numerate partici-
pants, more concrete mental images were associated with
higher donation amounts primarily through the mediating
effect of stronger affective reactions. Conversely, there
was no direct (β = .01, p = .94) or indirect effect (95% CI
[-.24, .13]) of mental images on donation amounts among
highly numerate individuals.
According to these results, the effect of (concrete)
mental images on donation amounts among the less nu-
merate was mediated by affective reactions. Highly nu-
merate individuals did not show this mediating effect
in Study 2. Correlational analyses revealed that their
(less concrete) mental images did not seem to be re-
lated to their donation amounts and affective reactions
(see Table 1). Instead, and as hypothesized (H6), among
highly numerate participants, donation amounts were
more strongly related to the estimated impact of a dona-
tion (r = .59) rather than the mental image of the victim (r
= −.03), z = 3.14, p < .01. Among less numerate individ-
uals, this difference in correlations was not significant, z
= 1.01, p = .32. Additionally, the relationship between
mental images and impact judgments reversed depending
on numeracy, z = 3.52, p < .001. Whereas clearer men-
9Using the more conservative Sobel test produced similar results
(Sobel test statistic = 2.98, p < .01 and Sobel test statistic = −0.56,
p > .57, for indirect effects of low and high numeracy, respectively).
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tal images correlated positively with impact judgments
for individuals lower in numeracy, those with higher nu-
meracy scores had a negative correlation between mental
images and impact judgments.
The finding that clearer mental images are related to
negative impact judgments for high numerate individuals
suggests that the mental images are qualitatively differ-
ent depending on numerical skill. For example, the men-
tal images of individuals with lower numeracy may be
constructed such that they relate to aspects of the victim
that are affectively arousing whereas images of individu-
als with higher numeracy may be related more to the nu-
meric aspects that signal the hopelessness of the situation.
Imagining the victims and their situation could focus the
attention of the higher numerate individuals on the small
proportion being helped and therefore reduce the impact
judgments. These results are consistent with prior find-
ings of highly numerate individuals drawing more affec-
tive meaning from numbers (Peters et al., 2006) and fur-
ther buttress the notion that the role of mental images in
donation decisions depends on people’s numeracy. Dona-
tion amounts among the highly numerate were not related
to their mental images but rather were associated with the
estimated impact of the donation.
These findings are noteworthy since, in the current
study, we did not observe mean donation amounts to de-
pend on numeracy. Yet, factors believed to be relevant in
the construction of the donation amount appear to depend
on numeracy, as mental images (and their relation to the
associated affective responses) of the underlying dona-
tions were different for more and less numerate individ-
uals. Central to this difference is that a clearer picture of
the victims was associated with greater impact judgments
of a donation among less numerate individuals, whereas
individuals with higher numeracy reported lower impact
judgments when they had clearer mental images of the
victims.
3.2.4 Combined mediation analysis
Recall that we found somewhat inconsistent results con-
cerning the indirect effect of mental imagery on donation
amounts for highly numerate individuals in Studies 1 and
2 (i.e., present in Study 1 and absent in Study 2). We
combined our data to increase power and conducted the
mediation analysis with all 342 participants (see Figure
4). Results revealed that the indirect effect was signif-
icant for less numerate individuals (95% CI [.07, .22]),
whereas the direct effect was marginally significant (β
= .11, p = .08). For highly numerate individuals, nei-
ther the direct (β = −.07, p = .38) nor the indirect effect
(95% CI [-.05, .21]) of mental images on donations was
significant. Therefore, when taking both studies into ac-
count, we found no evidence for mediation of the rela-
Figure 4: Combined mediation analyses
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b Regression coefficients with mental image and affective
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tion between mental imagery and donations through af-
fect among highly numerate individuals. A moderated
mediation (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) supported
this difference with an almost significant interaction be-
tween mental image and numeracy, b = −.18, p = .076.
The interaction suggests that the indirect effect of mental
image on donations through affect was stronger for less
numerate individuals than for highly numerate individu-
als.
4 General discussion
Donation requests typically confront people with numer-
ical information related to the need of others. Whether it
is the number of victims of a natural disaster, a proportion
of lives affected by a disease, or the number of individu-
als benefiting from a specific charitable cause, this kind
of information is conveyed with numbers. People’s abil-
ity to comprehend those numbers and derive meaningful
interpretations from them likely influences their decisions
to help. We conducted two studies to examine the joint
influence of numeracy and presentation format on peo-
ple’s willingness to donate money to a charitable cause
and on the processes underlying these donations.
Recent investigations of the underlying mechanisms of
pro-social behavior have stressed the role of affect and
mental imagery (e.g., Batson, 1990; Dickert et al., 2011;
Dickert & Slovic, 2009; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, b; Slovic,
2007; Small et al., 2007). Our results extend this research
by showing that the propensity to engage in mental im-
agery and to use it in donation decisions depends on nu-
meracy. Those lower in numeracy formed a clearer men-
tal representation of the victim(s) in both studies (con-
sistent with Dieckmann et al., 2009) and a stronger re-
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lationship between the mental image and affective reac-
tions in Study 2. Moreover, results showed that the ef-
fect of the mental image on donations among the less nu-
merate was mediated by affective responses that seemed
to spring from the mental image as theorized by Slovic
(2007). Higher numeracy, on the other hand, was related
to a less clear mental image of the people in need and
a diminished relationship between the mental image and
donation amounts. Although affective reactions of highly
numerate individuals may not always be influenced by
mental imagery concerning the victims, these affective
reactions nonetheless were associated with donations to
the same degree as for less numerate individuals. Based
on previous studies, we suspect that highly numerate in-
dividuals formed affective reactions from the magnitude
of the numbers or number comparisons (e.g., Peters, in
press; Peters et al., 2006). Furthermore, findings from
Study 2 suggested that, among highly numerate individ-
uals, the willingness to help also depended more on the
estimated impact of a donation than the mental image at-
tached to the victim(s).
Consistent with research on the effects of numeracy
and presentation formats on risk perceptions and medi-
cal decision making (e.g., Dieckmann et al., 2009; Peters
et al., 2006; Peters et al., 2011), our results suggest that
less numerate participants were susceptible to changes in
presentation format whereas highly numerate individuals
were relatively unaffected. In Study 1, based on a me-
dian split, less numerate individuals donated more money
when the victim was presented in a frequency format (i.e.,
one out of 100) compared to a percentage format (one
percent of 100). In Study 2, only less numerate individu-
als’ donations were influenced by both victim identifica-
tion and changes in victim number.
Whereas previous research has mainly focused on the
different sources of information that individuals higher
vs. lower in numeracy have at their disposal, our results
suggest that the processes by which individuals arrive at
a decision differs by numeric skill. Thus, more and less
numerate individuals initially may have the same infor-
mation available, but they process that information dif-
ferently and ultimately access and use different informa-
tion. In our donation tasks, it is possible that highly nu-
merate individuals did have access to number transforma-
tions that support concrete mental images (which would
be consistent with other research), but instead used dif-
ferent decision cues in their donation decisions. Nonethe-
less, our results point towards the possibility that greater
numeracy skills may be related to information processing
with less concrete mental imagery as a default compared
to those with lower numeracy skills.
4.1 Implications, limitations, and future re-
search
Our conceptualization of mental imagery and its differ-
ential influence for more and less numerate individuals’
willingness to donate could potentially be applied to a
range of other decision making domains. It should be
noted, however, that engaging in mental imagery is likely
dependent both on personal as well as situational fac-
tors (e.g., Jiang & Wyer, 2009; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).
Our research was geared specifically towards investigat-
ing differences in mental representations of other people
in need and whether changes in presentation format and
numerical ability affect charitable giving. As victims of
catastrophes are typically presented in numerical format,
we were interested in whether numeracy might influence
the construction of donation amounts. Future research
could expand on these findings and include more general
measurements of the propensity to form mental images
in a variety of contexts (e.g., Childers, Houston, & Heck-
ler, 1985). Additionally, it would be interesting to test
the effects of other personality factors associated with the
concreteness of mental representations and its relation to
giving (e.g., construal orientations).
In our studies we assessed affective reactions, men-
tal images, and the estimated impact of donations af-
ter confronting people with the donation decision. It is
possible that experienced affect can influence the per-
ceived physical distance to the victim and the propen-
sity to engage in more concrete mental representations
(Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010). Similarly,
it is conceivable that donation decisions influence affec-
tive reactions. However, based on the primacy-of-affect
argument (e.g., Slovic et al., 2002; Zajonc, 1980), we
maintain that affective reactions as well as mental images
(Slovic, 2007) can precede donation decisions; in fact,
Dickert and Slovic (2009) demonstrated that the ease with
which mental images are formed influences sympathy re-
sponses to victims in need.
Using other presentation formats could further extend
our studies. Donation situations in which the gist of
the numerical information is opposite for frequency vs.
probability formats would allow generalizing the effects
of numerical ability to situations in which comparative
judgments between different charitable causes have to be
made (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Peters et al., 2006;
Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Reyna et al., 2009). Addition-
ally, the effects of increasing the number of charitable or-
ganizations within a donation request (Soyer & Hogarth,
2011) or volunteers (Carroll, White, & Pahl, 2011) might
also relate to numeracy.
Finally, we acknowledge that the effects of numeri-
cal ability on willingness to donate probably do not su-
persede other relevant factors that influence charitable
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giving. Naturally, for example, differences in abstrac-
tion and numerical presentations of victim statistics may
be less important when financial constraints are present.
Nonetheless, as information about people in need is often
displayed in numerical format, we believe that a compre-
hensive picture of the underlying processes of donation
decisions needs to take individual differences in numeri-
cal ability into account. The current paper suggests that
the propensity to engage in concrete mental representa-
tions is weaker for individuals used to abstracting infor-
mation from numbers, and that this is a key element in
the underlying mechanisms of donation decisions.
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Appendix
Instructions for Study 2, unidentified condition with one
target victim:
Imagine that you have the possibility to donate to an
international humanitarian aid organization for children.
This organization is officially accredited and targets de-
veloping countries in order to improve the situation of
children through long-term programs and projects. Your
donation would be used to alleviate the hunger in Africa.
Your donation would be specifically used for one child
out of a group of 100 African children which all live in
poor conditions and are at risk of starvation. With a fi-
nancial donation you could improve the life of this child.
1. Would you want to donate money in order to save
this child?
[Please select]
Yes No
2. If yes, how much money would you donate?
Amount: ___________C
